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China’s influence in the UN system has been growing rapidly in recent years. Its 
increasing activism in the UN, in both more and less visible forms, is raising Asian 
and western eyebrows at a time of China’s more outspoken geopolitical manoeu-
vring. From the other side of the looking glass, the UN’s visibility and hence its 
potential influence in China may also be growing, a point that has been largely 
ignored. The UN is pursuing this goal by means of its public diplomacy efforts, 
which aim at greater visibility for the UN in China.
A question to be answered is how Beijing’s authoritarian government is 
responding to the UN’s outreach and potential UN influence inside China.1 One 
of the areas in which the UN has invested most is China’s own cyberspace. Sina 
Weibo, the social media platform that is home to China’s most vibrant online 
community, has seen the UN’s presence expand rapidly in the past decade.2 Here 
the UN is operating in a realm governed by national rules, in which the party-
state maintains a firm hold on national cyber infrastructure and a degree of social 
media surveillance that has a disciplining effect on all corners of society. How 
challenging is this environment for the UN?
UN online representation in China relies on more than 20 active official 
accounts on Weibo, coordinated by an overarching official account @lianheguo 
(‘United Nations’) that has over 10 million followers. The individuals on whom 
the UN has relied most to amplify its messages on Weibo are Chinese celebrities 
engaging with their own society on behalf of the UN and acting as informal 
UN goodwill ambassadors. The origins of this scheme date back to 1953;3 but 
* The authors would like to thank Charlotte Blanc for her excellent online research support in this project.
1 Matthew Louis Bishop and Zhang Xiaotong, ‘Why is China a reluctant leader of the World Trade Organiza-
tion?’, New Political Economy 25: 5, 2020, pp. 755–72; Rosemary Foot, China, the United Nations, and human 
protection: beliefs, power, image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘China vs 
the WHO: a behavioural norm conflict in the SARS crisis’, International Affairs 95: 3, May 2019, pp. 535–52.
2 Yuan Ren, ‘Know your Chinese social media’, New York Times, 19 Nov. 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/11/19/fashion/china-social-media-weibo-wechat.html; UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 
‘UN environment and Weibo join forces to launch Young Champions of the Earth in China’, press release, 23 
April 2018, https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-release/un-environment-and-weibo-
join-forces-launch-young-champions-earth; UN Development Programme, ‘On United Nations Weibo 
campaign, Jet Li shares the future he wants’, press release, 7 May 2012, https://www.cn.undp.org/content/
china/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2012/05/on-united-nations-weibo-campaign--jet-li-shares-the-
future-he-wa.html. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible 
on 22 March 2021.)
3 Andrew F. Cooper, Celebrity diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008), pp. 18–20. 
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it was only at the turn of the millennium that the then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan gave the greatest impulse to the goodwill ambassadors’ scheme.4 For 
the symbolic honorarium of US$1 a year, volunteer celebrity diplomats engage 
with the UN on a rolling, two-year contract and—remarkably considering their 
non-specialist profile—are considered by the UN as ‘experts on mission’ when 
travelling with a specific purpose related to their UN role.5 The UN goodwill 
ambassadors are to be distinguished from the smaller group of ‘messengers of 
peace’: in the latter scheme, launched in 1997, renowned individuals from different 
walks of life are invited to promote the UN’s work in a more general sense.6 
Outside the West the UN has a longstanding tradition of employing goodwill 
ambassadors for advocacy purposes aimed at generating public support. Global 
media coverage and the western-dominated academic literature on celebrities 
erroneously suggest that this is a fundamentally western phenomenon.7 This 
narrow academic scope has severely limited our understanding of celebrity diplo-
macy in a global perspective, and there is still very little empirical work on celeb-
rity diplomacy in many vibrant parts of the world outside the West.8 In China, 
celebrities’ visibility and influence have provided the UN with a convenient, even 
necessary, bridge through which the UN can enhance its presence in the Chinese 
public sphere. Today, the UN employs around 30 Chinese celebrities as global or 
regional goodwill ambassadors. Many of these individuals have a large following 
on Weibo, and they help the UN to amplify its messages by reposting messages 
from UN headquarters and by participating in online UN initiatives. The Chinese 
celebrities include mainland Chinese, Hong Kong and Macau citizens. It is very 
common for Chinese-speaking celebrities to operate simultaneously in these three 
regions.
China allows its citizens little scope for discussion and debate on global issues, 
and it is part of our central argument that, as a result, UN celebrities’ activism 
4 UN, Goodwill ambassadors (New York, Oct. 2020), https://www.un.org/en/mop/; Mark Alleyne, ‘The United 
Nations’ celebrity diplomacy’, SAIS Review of International Affairs 25: 1, 2005, p. 176. 
5 Secretary-General of the UN, Guidelines for the designation of goodwill ambassadors and messengers of peace (New 
York, 2003), http://www.un.org.ua/images/documents/4193/Guidelines_for_the_designation_of_Good-
will_Ambassadors_and_Messengers_of_Peace.pdf.
6 UN, Goodwill ambassadors; Papa Louis Fall and Guangting Tang, Goodwill ambassadors in the UN system (Geneva: 
Joint Inspection Unit, 2006), https://undocs.org/en/JIU/NOTE/2006/1.
7 See Alleyne, ‘The United Nations’ celebrity diplomacy’; Alison Anderson, ‘Sources, media, and modes of 
climate change communication: the role of celebrities’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 2: 4, 
2011, pp. 535–46; Lucy Bennett, ‘“If we stick together we can do anything”: Lady Gaga fandom, philanthropy 
and activism through social media’, Celebrity Studies 5: 1–2, 2014, pp. 138–52; Andrew F. Cooper, ‘Beyond 
Hollywood and the boardroom: celebrity diplomacy’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 8: 2, 2007, pp. 
125–32; Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar, ‘The downside of celebrity diplomacy: the neglected complexity 
of development’, Global Governance 14: 3, 2008, pp. 259–64; Douglas Kellner, ‘Celebrity diplomacy, spectacle 
and Barack Obama’, Celebrity Studies 1: 1, 2010, pp. 121–3; Lauren Kogen, ‘For the public good or just good 
publicity? Celebrity diplomacy and the ethics of representation’, Mass Communication and Society 18: 1, 2015, 
pp. 37–57.
8 See Andrew F. Cooper, Hugo Dobson and Mark Wheeler, ‘Non-western celebrity politics and diplomacy: 
introduction’, Celebrity Studies 8: 2, 2017, pp. 312–17. For exceptions, see Olga Fedorenko, ‘Korean-wave 
celebrities between global capital and regional nationalisms’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 18: 4, 2017, pp. 498–517; 
Elaine Jeffreys, ‘Translocal celebrity activism: shark-protection campaigns in mainland China’, Environmen-
tal Communication 10: 6, 2016, pp. 763–76; Marc Owen Jones, ‘Nation branding and celebrity diplomacy in 
Bahrain’, Celebrity Studies 8: 2, 2017, pp. 324–30. 
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in China is increasingly symbolic. Although officially accredited by the UN 
to support its external communications, Chinese celebrities are aware of their 
national leadership’s expectations that they display vigorous patriotism in their 
messaging. China’s special attention to its domestic public as an integral part of 
public diplomacy antedates, by and large, western practices and academic research 
taking heed of this dimension.9 The impact of local conditions on foreign public 
diplomacy efforts has, however, been largely ignored in public diplomacy studies. 
Interesting recent research has started to examine the discrepancy between the 
content of public diplomacy, as intended by the initiating state, and the altera-
tion of narratives and perceptions on the other side of the looking glass, among 
the recipient audiences.10 Our focus on celebrity diplomacy in an authoritarian 
society highlights the impact of structural socio-political conditions on the public 
diplomacy efforts of a foreign actor, in our case not a state but the UN. In theory, 
this may place locally engaged Chinese celebrities at an interesting juncture, as 
agile juggling agents between principals with diverging interests. We are inter-
ested in empirically establishing the complexities of how this plays out in practice, 
with a focus on communication in the digital sphere.
Existing studies have analysed how the UN goodwill ambassadorship scheme 
functions in western surroundings, but their conclusions are often not applicable 
to a country that is so culturally and politically different from these.11 While 
China’s global influence in the UN is currently expanding, with more than 
one-quarter of UN agencies led by Chinese representatives, under President Xi 
Jinping’s leadership its domestic public sphere has simultaneously been shrinking. 
This presents Chinese celebrities with collective norms and expectations regarding 
their individual behaviour, which are generally understood with or without 
governmental guidance and instruction.
Chinese celebrities, many of whom work in the creative industries, are 
probably the most visibly affected group in China’s present shift towards collec-
tivism and away from individual freedom and debate. It is hard to overestimate the 
restraining nature of these conditions for them. Against this backdrop, it is perti-
nent to examine how these celebrities are working in their capacity as the UN’s 
message-amplifiers on Weibo, perhaps China’s most heavily censored social media 
platform, while also seeking favour with the party-state. What are the special 
characteristics of Chinese UN ambassadors’ online communications, and how do 
9 For an authoritative Chinese academic statement on China’s public diplomacy, see Kejin Zhao, ‘The China 
model of public diplomacy and its future’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14: 1–2, 2019, pp. 169–81. On the recent 
politicization of China’s public diplomacy, see Ingrid d’Hooghe, ‘China’s public diplomacy goes political’, 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy 16: 2–3, pp. 299–322. See also Ellen Huijgh, Diplomacy at home: domestic dimensions 
(Leiden: Brill–Nijhoff, 2019).
10 Molly Krasnodebska, ‘The Ukraine crisis as an unintended consequence of the EU’s public diplomacy: recep-
tion of EU narratives in Ukraine’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 13: 3, 2018, pp. 345–65; Natalia Chaban and 
Ole Elgström, ‘A perceptual approach to EU public diplomacy: investigating collaborative diplomacy in EU–
Ukraine relations’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 15: 4, 2020, pp. 1–29.
11 Cooper, ‘Beyond Hollywood and the boardroom’; Mark Wheeler, ‘Celebrity diplomacy: United Nations’ 
goodwill ambassadors and messengers of peace’, Celebrity Studies: Celebrity and the Transnational 2: 1, 2011, pp. 
6–18; A. Trevor Thrall, Jaime Lollio-Fakhreddine, John Berent, Lana Donnelly et al., ‘Star power: celebrity 
advocacy and the evolution of the public sphere’, International Journal of Press/Politics 13: 4, 2008, pp. 362–85.
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these contrast with the understanding of western celebrity politics and diplomacy, 
presented largely uncontested in the literature? This case throws new light on the 
contradictions existing in the UN goodwill ambassadorship scheme and highlights 
the politics of celebrity diplomacy.
We seek answers to these unexplored questions by interrogating Weibo activism 
by UN-affiliated Chinese celebrities since 2013, the year when Xi Jinping came 
into office. We examine and try to make sense of how these celebrities navigate 
the online environment in both transnational and national spaces in the face of 
diverging demands and expectations. Our two-part research question is this: Have 
Chinese celebrities become more active in their capacity as UN ambassadors in China’s digital 
space? And do the content and tone of their online communication in recent years reveal any 
significant change? To help answer this question, we collected data from a sample of 
Chinese celebrities’ Weibo profiles and analysed them with a combination of quali-
tative and quantitative approaches explained in the methodological section below. 
We have deliberately not taken into account the substitution effect introduced 
by the rise of other social media platforms, including WeChat and video-sharing 
platforms such as TikTok and Kuaishou. We analyse the number of advocacy-
related posts, which is declining in a few of the nine cases examined in this study, 
and not the total number of Weibo posts—regardless of their content—which has 
been increasing over the years for most of the celebrities that we examined.
The findings of our study help correct the western and Anglocentric bias in 
existing celebrity diplomacy research, which Andrew F. Cooper emphasized in 
his short 2008 monograph.12 Our research is intended to encourage more academic 
study of non-state diplomacy in non-western conditions. The Chinese case helps 
to shed light on the dynamics of authoritarian states’ engagement with and 
response to the UN goodwill ambassadorship scheme, and what this means for the 
UN celebrities’ diplomatic-cum-political role in their home environment. After 
all, the UN may be dominated by liberal democracies, but it accommodates many 
authoritarian countries. Can they be seen to serve the transnational goals of the 
UN as the sending organization as well as the national interests of the receiving 
country? This study may also help UN policy-makers to fine-tune their celebrity 
diplomacy in authoritarian societies, and will provide the Chinese government 
with insights into the role of non-state actors in China–UN relations.
The first section introduces our case-study and its special characteristics. Next 
comes a review of the literature on celebrity diplomacy, emphasizing among other 
things the importance of a conceptual distinction between celebrity politics and 
multilayered celebrity diplomacy. The methodological section then introduces our 
main hypothesis and the quantitative methods we used to investigate social media 
data. In the penultimate part, we discuss the results of our social media analysis. 
Finally, our conclusions aim to foster a less parochial study of celebrity diplomacy 
in a global perspective, and we offer a brief evaluation of policy implications.
12 Cooper, Celebrity diplomacy.
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Celebrity diplomacy with Chinese characteristics
No study has to date specifically investigated UN celebrity diplomacy in China, 
although there are many studies on celebrity culture and celebrity philanthropy.13 
This gap is remarkable, as the number of UN-affiliated Chinese celebrities has 
grown rapidly in recent years, both because of China’s growing engagement with 
the UN and because the UN celebrity diplomacy initiative has expanded as a 
global project. This discrepancy can be explained to some extent by the fact that, 
compared to their western counterparts, Chinese celebrities operate in a politi-
cally and culturally isolated environment. Many of them are present almost exclu-
sively in the Sinophone world and have little projection outside. If transnational 
mobilizing power is to be considered the hallmark of celebrity diplomacy, one 
might be tempted to ask whether some Chinese celebrities are conducting such 
diplomacy at all.
Existing studies on Chinese celebrities have largely been limited to the domestic 
context.14 We examine three topics concerning the workings of Chinese celebri-
ties: (1) their relationship with the party-state; (2) their social roles; and (3) the 
production and consumption of celebrities. The first theme is unique to the 
Chinese case and has informed the design of this research, while the latter two 
themes are relevant to studies dealing with Chinese celebrities and also celebrities 
from other regions.
In China, celebrities operate under the supervision of two government entities: 
the Ministry of Culture and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television, which have the power to regulate celebrities’ public appear-
ances in the mediascape and online.15 This power relationship also manifests itself 
in a more subtle way and brings commercial success into the mix for the celebri-
ties involved.16 While Chinese celebrities are not actively compelled or nudged to 
endorse government policies, choosing to do so will massively boost their careers 
in China’s highly competitive entertainment industry. This entertainment–
politics nexus implies that Chinese celebrities have relatively limited agency as 
celebrity diplomats, and in fact also as entertainer–entrepreneurs. Any form of 
political activism must fall within the bounds set by the state if it is to boost or 
even maintain their celebrity status—the very platform that allowed them such 
influence in the first place. 
In Chinese society, celebrities are expected to play the role of moral leaders 
who have personal integrity and actively contribute to good social causes, such 
13 Elaine Jeffreys and Louise Edwards, ‘Celebrity in China’, in Elaine Jeffreys and Louise Edwards, eds, Celebrity 
in China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), pp. 1–20.
14 Some examples are: Elaine Jeffreys, ‘Political celebrities and elite politics in contemporary China’, China 
Information 30: 1, 2016, pp. 58–80; Jonathan Sullivan and Séagh Kehoe, ‘Truth, good and beauty: the politics 
of celebrity in China’, China Quarterly, vol. 237, 2019, pp. 241–56; Jonathan Hassid and Elaine Jeffreys, ‘Doing 
good or doing nothing? Celebrity, media and philanthropy in China’, Third World Quarterly 36: 1, 2015, pp. 
75–93; Johanna Hood, ‘Peng Liyuan’s humanitarianism: morality, politics and eyeing the present and past’, 
Celebrity Studies  6: 4, 2015, pp.  414–29; Elaine Jeffreys and Jian Xu, ‘Celebrity-inspired, fan-driven: doing 
philanthropy through social media in mainland China’, Asian Studies Review 41: 2, 2017, pp. 244–62.
15 Sullivan and Kehoe, ‘Truth, good and beauty’. 
16 Jeffreys and Edwards, ‘Celebrity in China’, pp. 1–20.
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as poverty alleviation and education. Patriotism, too, is still highly relevant in 
east Asian societies,17 and ranks very high on the Chinese public’s mental check-
list. This strong social dimension of China’s celebrity culture has already been 
addressed by a large variety of studies focusing on celebrity philanthropy (‘celan-
thropy’) and celebrity activism in China.18 Along with political expectations from 
the party-state, public expectations are a key variable shaping China’s celebrity 
culture and, we assume, profoundly influencing Chinese celebrities’ online 
presence and communicative behaviour.
How do governmental and public expectations, then, interact with celebri-
ties’ activity as UN ambassadors? Remarkably, despite the universally accepted 
label ‘celebrity diplomacy’ used to describe this non-governmental practice, it 
has mostly been discussed outside the field of diplomatic studies and as a political 
occurrence rather than a diplomatic phenomenon. This state of affairs needs to 
be remedied, as celebrity diplomacy across the world has by no means reached its 
peak yet.
The celebrity phenomenon as diplomatic practice
The interdisciplinary study of celebrity diplomacy does seem to have peaked in the 
Anglosphere, with relatively little original scholarly work since 2013.19 There has 
been remarkably little attention given to the international engagement of celebrities 
among students of diplomacy, particularly since celebrity diplomacy is commonly 
seen as a subset of public diplomacy, which itself has been the most researched 
aspect of diplomatic practice since the turn of the millennium.20 Such scholarly 
input as there has been has come mainly from disciplines and fields such as political 
communication, culture studies and political science/public administration.
Scholars of celebrity diplomacy owe a great deal to the imaginative and explor-
atory work of Cooper.21 More recently, Mark Wheeler has served readers with his 
integrating studies.22 We suggest that there is now a strong case for more empirical 
17 Fedorenko, ‘Korean-wave celebrities between global capital and regional nationalisms’.
18 See e.g. Hood, ‘Peng Liyuan’s humanitarianism’; Johanna Hood, ‘Celebrity philanthropy in China: the politi-
cal critique of Pu Cunxin’s AIDS heroism’, in Lisa Ann Richley, ed., Celebrity humanitarianism and North–
South relations: politics, place and power (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 106–28; Elaine Jeffreys, 
‘Modern China’s idols: heroes, role models, stars and celebrities’, PORTAL: Journal of Multidisciplinary Interna-
tional Studies 9: 1, 2012, pp. 1–32; Elaine Jeffreys, ‘Celebrity philanthropy in China: rethinking cultural studies’ 
“big citizen” critique’, in Anthony Elliott, ed., Routledge handbook of celebrity studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2018), pp. 227–42.
19 There are a few exceptions: see e.g. Kogen, ‘For the public good or just good publicity?’; Alexandra Cosima 
Budabin, ‘Celebrities as norm entrepreneurs in international politics: Mia Farrow and the “Genocide Olym-
pics” campaign’, Celebrity Studies 6: 4, 2015, pp. 399–413.
20 For this omission, see recent textbooks on public diplomacy: Nicholas J. Cull, Public diplomacy: foundations 
for global engagement in the digital age (Cambridge: Polity, 2019); Ilan Manor, The digitalization of public diplomacy 
(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Jan Melissen, ‘Public diplomacy’, in Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wise-
man, eds, Diplomacy in a globalizing world: theories and practices (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 
199–218.
21 Cooper, Celebrity diplomacy.
22 Mark Wheeler, Celebrity politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Mark Wheeler, ‘Celebrity diplomacy’, in Costas 
Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp, eds, The Sage handbook of diplomacy (London: Sage, 2016) pp. 
530–39.






/ia/article/97/3/667/6270680 by guest on 20 M
ay 2021
UN celebrity diplomacy in China
673
International Affairs 97: 3, 2021
and theoretical research on celebrity diplomacy. First and foremost, this field needs 
to be taken out of the Anglosphere. Furthermore, it will have to move beyond the 
normative discussion of western cultural icons’ activism as cultural imperialism 
and ‘celebrity colonialism’.23 Transcending this narrow linguistic scope and these 
limited cultural critiques is a condition for a better understanding of what celeb-
rities do and how they communicate as informal diplomats. What is remarkable 
from our study’s point of view is that the literature focusing on western celebrities 
or the North–South divide has largely overlooked the particularly vibrant celeb-
rity culture in Asia—the world’s most highly populated mega-region and the one 
with the most energetic social media environment. As a result, existing literature 
has yet to analyse how local political and cultural conditions affect the form and 
scope of celebrity diplomacy.24
Second, the most prominent feature of celebrity activity in the past decade is 
that it has largely moved online. Stars without a presence on the internet are rare, 
and celebrities tend to prioritize engagement with their followers through social 
networking sites, particularly microblogs, via both global sites like Twitter and 
regional and national ones such as Weibo. Celebrities’ conversion to internet-based 
advocacy constitutes a change with important social and political ramifications. 
Research that interrogates the intervention of new technologies is therefore essen-
tial, in order to inform our understanding of celebrity diplomacy as an evolving 
concept. This study is a contribution to recent academic work that stresses the 
importance of understanding diplomacy in the digital age. So far, this literature 
has not looked into celebrity diplomacy.25
Third, there is a clear case for building on the normative critiques of trans-
national celebrity activity and its effectiveness,26 with a greater and more system-
atic research focus on celebrities’ communicative practices. This would improve 
23 Cooper, Celebrity diplomacy; Andrew F. Cooper, ‘Celebrity diplomats: differentiation, recognition, and 
contestation’, in P. David Marshall and Sean Redmond, eds, A companion to celebrity (Malden, MA: Wiley, 
2015), pp. 258–72.
24 This is also recognized in Cooper et al., ‘Non-western celebrity politics and diplomacy’. An exception is the 
work of Florian Schneider, ‘China’s “Big V” bloggers: how celebrities intervene in digital Sino-Japanese rela-
tions’, Celebrity Studies 8: 2, 2017, pp. 331–6. Nevertheless, this work is concerned with one particular bilateral 
relationship.
25 For relevant work published in the last three years, see Corneliu Bjola, Jennifer Cassidy and Ilan Manor, 
‘Public diplomacy in the digital age’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14: 1–2, 2019, pp. 83–101; Michèle Bos and Jan 
Melissen, ‘Rebel diplomacy and digital communication: public diplomacy in the Sahel’, International Affairs 
95: 6, 2019, pp. 1331–48; Emillie de Keulenaar and Jan Melissen, ‘Critical digital diplomacy and how theory 
can inform practice’, in Volker Stanzel, ed., New realities in foreign affairs: diplomacy in the 21st century (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2019), pp. 63–70; Constance Duncombe, ‘Digital diplomacy: emotion and identity in the 
public realm’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14: 1–2, 2019, pp. 102–16; Constance Duncombe, ‘Social media and 
the visibility of horrific violence’, International Affairs 96: 3, 2020, pp. 609–29; Ilan Manor and Rhys Cril-
ley, ‘The mediatization of MFAs: diplomacy in the new media ecology’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 15: 1–2, 
2020, pp. 66–92; Efe Sevin and Diana Ingenhoff, ‘Public diplomacy on social media: analyzing networks and 
content’, International Journal of Communication, vol. 12, 2018, pp. 3663–85; Damien Spry, ‘From Delhi to Dili: 
Facebook diplomacy by ministries of foreign affairs in the Asia–Pacific’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14: 1–2, 
2020, pp. 93–125; Maja Simunjak and Alessandro Calandrio, ‘Twiplomacy in the age of Donald Trump: is the 
diplomatic code changing?’, Information Society 35: 1, 2019, pp. 13–12. 
26 See e.g. Dieter and Kumar, ‘The downside of celebrity diplomacy’; Thrall et al., ‘Star power’; Ilan Kapoor, 
Celebrity humanitarianism: the ideology of global charity (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2012); Kogen, ‘For 
the public good or just good publicity?’; and Wheeler, ‘Celebrity diplomacy’.
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our understanding of the influence of celebrities in international politics and their 
roles in more networked and campaign-oriented processes of diplomacy. Practice 
research could also act as a stimulus for greater engagement with social theory, 
which has so far been limited.
Fourth, there is much to be gained from studying celebrity diplomacy in 
authoritarian public spaces. Our study shows that we need to improve our under-
standing of how authoritarianism curbs the potential of celebrity diplomats in 
particular.
We agree with the dominant view of celebrity diplomacy as a subset of public 
diplomacy, with its ‘new public diplomacy’ emphasis on the role of non-state actors 
of various kinds and on dialogue-based communication.27 It therefore makes sense 
for any discussion on celebrity advocacy and activism to stay abreast of recent 
debates on public diplomacy, which have recently given particular emphasis to the 
impact on transnational dialogue of rampant disinformation and the conceptual 
merger between public diplomacy and domestic outreach, overriding the tradi-
tional distinction between the two.28 
The difference between politics and diplomacy, as separate but overlapping 
domains, matters for our definition of celebrity diplomacy, as does the variance 
between the (once again intersecting) activities of diplomatic practice and policy-
making. We take Wheeler’s description of celebrity diplomacy as a starting point: 
‘the employment of well-known or famous individuals to publicize international 
causes and to engage in foreign policy-making circles’.29 This leaves us, however, 
without a substantive answer to the questions about how celebrities work and what 
they do. Our diplomatic studies perspective is interested in the celebrity phenom-
enon as diplomatic practice. Cooper initiated the discussion of celebrities with 
both an essentialist, actor-centric IR perspective on their role, underscoring their 
growing agency in the transnational public sphere, and a relationalist diplomatic 
studies outlook on their interactions and relationships.30 In this study, we define 
celebrity diplomacy as informal diplomatic practice consisting of the engagement of famous 
27 Jan Melissen, ‘Public diplomacy’, in Kerr and Wiseman, eds, Diplomacy in a globalizing world, pp. 199–218. 
28 For recent academic work that aims to gain a better understanding of the disinformation challenge in a 
public diplomacy perspective, see e.g. Corneliu Bjola and Krysianna Papadakis, ‘Digital propaganda, counter-
publics and the disruption of the public sphere: the Finnish approach of building digital resilience’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 33: 5, 2020, pp. 638–66; Yevgeni Golovchenko, Mareike Hartmann and Rebecca 
Adler-Nissen, ‘State, media and civil society in the information warfare over Ukraine: citizen curators of 
digital disinformation’, International Affairs 94: 5, 2018, pp. 975–94; Erik C. Nisbet and Olga Kamenchuk, 
‘The psychology of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns and implications for public diplomacy’, Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy 14: 1–2, 2019, pp. 65–82; Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft power and public diplomacy revisited’, 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14: 1–2, 2019, pp. 7–20; Sophie L. Vériter, Corneliu Bjola and Joachim A. Koops, 
‘Tackling COVID-19 disinformation: internal and external challenges of the European Union’, Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy 15: 4, 2020, pp. 569–82. On public diplomacy in the domestic environment, see Huijgh, Diplo-
macy at home; Paul Sharp, ‘Domestic public diplomacy, domestic diplomacy, and domestic foreign policy’, 
in Gunther Hellmann, Andreas Fahrmeir and Milos Vec, eds, The transformation of foreign policy: drawing and 
managing boundaries from antiquity to the present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 263–84.
29 Wheeler, ‘Celebrity diplomacy’, p. 53.
30 Cooper, Celebrity diplomacy. See also Liza Tsaliki, Christos Frangonikolopoulos and Asteris Huliaras, ‘Making 
sense of transnational celebrity activism: causes, methods and consequences’, in Liza Tsaliki, Christos Fran-
gonikolopoulos and Asteris Huliaris, eds, Transnational celebrity activism in global politics: changing the world (Bris-
tol: Intellect, 2011), pp. 295–312. 
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persons, either on behalf of established international actors or as independent entrepreneurs, in 
transnational advocacy work, public dialogue and political mobilization for purposes of global 
causes and modern norms.
Various typologies of celebrity diplomacy have been helpful in generating 
interdisciplinary interest in and understanding of this relatively new object of 
study.31 The often normative discussion and ideological critique in the literature, 
as well as the wider polemic surrounding celebrity activism, extending to both 
mainstream and social media, may have tainted celebrity studies as an academic 
pursuit, at least to some extent. There has also been harsh academic criticism from 
within. As early as 2010, David Marsh, Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall maintained 
that the literature on celebrity politics tends to be ‘rarely systematic; more often it 
is superficial and anecdotal’.32 Some good work was published in the years immedi-
ately following these authors’ critical appraisal, but in our view there remains a 
case for more systematic analysis and theorizing, and indeed, this work is vital to 
move celebrity studies forward.
Existing disciplinary boundaries are likely to have contributed to a degree of 
analytical compartmentalization of celebrity diplomacy activity, which is in fact 
defying traditional political boundaries. Political scientists and public administra-
tion scholars’ contributions tend to be limited to the interaction of celebrities 
with domestic politics and the formal political sphere. Marsh, ’t Hart and Tindall’s 
typology, which identifies celebrity endorsers, celebrity advocates and celebrity 
politicians seeking office, for instance, is driven by an interest in political outcomes. 
The focus of their interest is on what famous individuals can bring to politics in 
terms of electoral or policy gains. Political participation and engagement—areas 
of the informal political process that are of greater interest for celebrities—fall 
outside the scope of their study.33 Equally, some of the early research on celebri-
ties in political communication that was undertaken around a decade ago focused 
on the traditional political realm and established politicians, rather than on celeb-
rities as outsiders entering and transforming the political sphere.34 
John Street makes a valid case for more comprehension of ‘the impact of celeb-
rity politics on citizens’,35 referring to celebrity diplomacy in democratic political 
contexts. Our case-study shows that there is a need for parallel academic research 
on celebrity diplomacy in democratic and authoritarian public spaces, and this 
applies especially to the social impact of current communication technologies as 
the most significant recent development. That brings us right back to our own 
study on the online activities of Chinese UN celebrities on Weibo.
31 See e.g. David Marsh, Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall, ‘Celebrity politics: the politics of the late modernity?’, 
Political Studies Review 8: 3, 2010, pp. 322–40; Oliver Driessens, ‘Celebrity capital: redefining celebrity using 
field theory’, Theory and Society 42: 5, 2013, pp. 543–60.
32 Marsh et al., ‘Celebrity politics’, p. 322. 
33 Marsh et al., ‘Celebrity politics’.
34 Aeron Davis and Emily Seymour, ‘Generating forms of media capital inside and outside a field: the strange 
case of David Cameron in the UK political field’, Media, Culture and Society 32: 5, 2010, pp. 739–59.
35 John Street, ‘Do celebrity politics and celebrity politicians matter?’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 14: 3, 2012, p. 356. 






/ia/article/97/3/667/6270680 by guest on 20 M
ay 2021
Saskia Postema and Jan Melissen
676
International Affairs 97: 3, 2021
Our methodological approach
We have identified social media as an important venue for the conduct of diplo-
macy. Researchers into digital diplomacy have used a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative methods to study the social media activities of diplomatic actors, 
including content analysis (which we performed for this article), discourse analysis 
and various quantitative methods.36 Our choice of research methods complements 
the existing celebrity diplomacy literature’s heavy reliance on anecdotal informa-
tion. Our study’s sample size of nine cases explains the focus on general statistical 
trends, rather than a quantitative analysis involving multiple variables, that under-
pins our significant empirical results.
More than their western counterparts, Chinese celebrities operate within the 
bounds of constant political discipline, as well as an exceptional, by western 
standards, degree of observation by society over the acceptability of their attitudes 
and conduct. It is the duty of UN-affiliated celebrities in general to help the UN 
institution amplify its messages. In the dynamic context of Beijing’s increasing 
engagement with the UN, moreover, Chinese celebrities have incentives to satisfy 
two other demands when joining the UN discourse in China’s online space. First, 
because much of China’s collaboration with UN agencies is official, Chinese celeb-
rities’ amplifying of UN messages constitutes a direct endorsement of the Chinese 
government and is thus indirectly rewarding for the celebrities themselves. 
Second, celebrities can use their UN activism to fulfil the social obligations placed 
upon them by Chinese civil society, which is historically preoccupied with moral 
virtues, in a global as well as a national setting. With more and more Chinese 
people exposed to and supporting narratives on the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), it is only a matter of time before Chinese celebrities feel pressured 
to integrate these causes into their public personas.
These strong incentives for China’s goodwill ambassadors to act as UN diplo-
mats, combined with their constrained agency—as imposed by China’s political 
system and the Chinese public’s moral anxiety—present a fascinating puzzle for 
research. We seek to answer the following question: have China’s UN-affiliated 
celebrities been playing a more active diplomatic role on Weibo, and can we 
discern changes in their online communication against the backdrop of China’s 
growing activism in the UN? To help find the answer, we pose the following 
hypothesis: 
If celebrity diplomats are constantly looking to meet the heterogeneous expectations of the 
UN, the party-state and the Chinese public, they should not have significantly increased their 
UN-related activism under conditions of a shrinking public space. Instead, they are expected to 
have adopted an ever more ‘diplomatic’ approach, employing tact and reticence when fulfilling 
their duties as UN ambassadors. 
To test this hypothesis, our empirical investigation focused on the Weibo 
activity of a sample of nine Chinese celebrities affiliated with the UN during 
the period from 2013 to 2019, under Xi Jinping’s presidency. We chose the micro-
36 See e.g. Corneliu Bjola and Marcus Holmes, Digital diplomacy: theory and practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
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blog platform Sina Weibo because it is one of the biggest social networking sites 
in China, with 516 million monthly active users in the fourth quarter of 2019.37 
Despite being subject to government monitoring and regulation, Sina Weibo has 
been designed as an open platform that shares many common features with its 
western counterpart Twitter. It is also the platform that—as well as the UN—
other international organizations, national embassies and foreign entities use to 
reach out to the Chinese public through their official accounts.
Our close examination of some 300 posts used a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods. We extracted social media posts relevant to a celebrity’s 
diplomatic role—that is, those that either mention the UN in the body text or 
that interact with UN accounts, hashtags and posts, including retweeting. Weibo’s 
built-in search function facilitated a keyword search in a user’s posts and reposts. 
Two types of posts were extracted. The first contained the keyword ‘United 
Nations’ (lianheguo). This keyword can appear in the body text (including in the 
repost), as (part of ) a Weibo handle or as a hashtag in an extracted post. Since all 
names of UN agencies begin with these three characters in the Chinese language 
and the UN’s official Weibo accounts all have these three characters in their 
handles, the number of these posts will most directly reflect a celebrity’s level of 
activity as the UN’s message-amplifier. The second batch of posts presents celeb-
rities’ online activism beyond their UN ambassadorial roles. We extracted these 
posts by using search words pertaining to celebrity diplomats’ specialized issue 
areas.38 We manually excluded posts containing the keyword ‘United Nations’ 
from this batch to avoid an inflation of the numbers. We subsequently examined 
the respective numbers of these two kinds of posts and their content. Apart from 
these advocacy posts, we paid attention to content endorsing government narra-
tives and posts interacting with non-UN activist/philanthropic groups, so as to 
understand how celebrities navigate different roles and expectations. 
Our sample contained nine celebrities, not selected randomly but chosen because 
of the similarity of their activity on Weibo. A randomly selected sample of celeb-
rities who post several times a week and those who hardly post anything would 
not have enabled a statistically viable analysis and would therefore not have led 
to any meaningful conclusion.39 Also, we selected only celebrities working in the 
entertainment industry (for example, musicians, stage actors and directors). They 
constitute the majority of the list of UN-affiliated Chinese celebrities and their 
presences on social media tend to be similar, which helped us identify common 
trends regarding their UN ambassador roles. Table 1 (overleaf ) displays the profile 
information of the selected celebrities. Our empirical design thus enables us, first, 
to reveal whether and how UN-affiliated Chinese celebrities have been engaged 
37 The data were derived from Statista, China: MAU of Sina Weibo 2020 (New York, 29 May 2020), number of 
monthly active users of Sina Weibo from 4th quarter 2017 to 3rd quarter 2020 (in millions): https://www.
statista.com/statistics/795303/china-mau-of-sina-weibo/.
38 For example, in the case of the UNEP ambassador Li Bingbing, the keywords used were earth (diqiu), environ-
ment (huanjing), sustainability (kechixu), pollution (wuran) and climate (qihou).
39 An additional issue was that some UN-affiliated Chinese celebrities, such as Peng Liyuan and Gong Li, do not 
have verified official Weibo accounts, while others, such as Yao Chen, have opted to display only their most 
recent posts (for example, from the past six months). This made random sampling not a feasible option.






/ia/article/97/3/667/6270680 by guest on 20 M
ay 2021
Saskia Postema and Jan Melissen
678
International Affairs 97: 3, 2021
in Weibo activism, and second, to assess whether any change can be observed in 
Chinese celebrities’ communication since 2013. The next section will discuss the 
results of our online analysis.
Results and discussion
Figures 1 and 2 display the number of advocacy posts by our selected celebrities in 
each year from the period 2013–19. Figure 1 shows the number of ‘UN advocacy 
posts’, which were extracted using the keyword ‘United Nations’; figure 2 shows 
the number of posts containing keywords pertaining to issue areas not using the 
keyword United Nations (hence labelled as ‘non-UN advocacy posts’ for conve-
nience).
Table 1: Selected celebrities’ profiles, listed chronologically by date of 
UN affiliation










Jackie Chan Actor UNICEF April 2004 31 1.1






Li Bingbing Actress UNEP July 2010 43 5
Chen Kun Actor UNICEF Sept. 2010 93 6.2
Hai Qing Actress UN Women Oct. 2015 14 2.1
Huang 
Xiaoming
Actor UNAIDS Nov. 2016 61 4
Tong Dawei Actor UN Women Nov. 2016 27 3.6
Li Chen Actor UNEP Sept. 2017 56 7.7
Karry Wang Singer UNEP April 2018 78 1.3
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The invisible ambassador
It is immediately clear from the above statistical analysis that the nine celebrity 
diplomats under study are not equally active in their UN ambassador roles, at 
least not on Weibo. Most notably, Jackie Chan has not made any UN advocacy 
posts during the seven-year period, in fact not at all in his entire posting history 
on Weibo, while maintaining a steady posting frequency of around several times 
a month. In comparison, Lang Lang, who was appointed a UNICEF ambassador 
the same year as Chan, has been much more active. While this limited sample 
Figure 1: Number of UN advocacy posts made by each celebrity in each 
year
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hardly permits any definite causal inference, a possible explanation of Chan’s total 
inactivity might be that he is from Hong Kong, which distinguishes him from all 
of the other celebrities in the sample. As a Hong Kong citizen, one is constantly 
scrutinized for one’s political stance in China’s highly politicized public sphere. 
We feel it is safe to speculate that in order to secure popularity among his Chinese 
audience and potentially also Chinese government support, Chan has chosen 
to prioritize the construction and exhibition of his Chinese, People’s Republic 
of China identity over his cosmopolitan identity as a UNICEF ambassador. If 
‘China’ (zhongguo) instead of ‘United Nations’ had been used as the search word, 35 
posts would have been extracted, many of them containing strongly nationalistic 
content. For example, on 13 March 2018 Chan retweeted a post by @CCTVFi-
nance, an official account of China’s largest state-owned broadcaster, saying:
I am proud that I come from China, a place to entrust in my heart. There is a motherland 
behind me wherever I go, looking at me with caring eyes. These are the most touching 
lines of lyrics that I know ... After the reunification, I can say I am Chinese wherever I go.40
It is important to note that while the word ‘Chinese’ can mean both ‘from 
China’ and ‘belonging to the Chinese ethnic group’ in English, in this and many 
other Weibo posts, Chan used the Chinese word that has only the first of these 
two meanings: zhongguoren. Since zhongguo means ‘the Chinese state’—that is, the 
People’s Republic of China—this declaration by UN goodwill ambassador Jackie 
Chan is unmistakably nationalistic.
Beyond his UN role, Chan—as the founder of two charitable foundations—
has made a moderate effort to raise netizens’ awareness of child poverty and educa-
tion, as figure 2 suggests. It would therefore be accurate to describe Chan as an 
invisible rather than inactive UNICEF ambassador on Weibo. However, even his 
non-UN advocacy has seemed to be declining in the past few years, which can be 
considered an indirect answer to the main question driving this study regarding 
Chinese UN celebrity diplomacy since the watershed year 2013.
The generation gap
The figures display a clear divide between the ‘old-generation’ UN ambassadors—
Jackie Chan, Lang Lang, Li Bingbing and Chen Kun, all of whom were appointed 
before Xi Jinping came into office—and the newly appointed UN goodwill ambas-
sadors. In comparison to the newly appointed group, old-generation ambassadors’ 
online communication is characterized by three distinct features.
First, their activism extends further, beyond their UN roles, in terms of both 
posting frequency and the content of their posts. They engage with a wider 
range of issues and interact with a wider variety of parties, including many local 
activist and/or philanthropic organizations. For example, apart from the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Li Bingbing interacts frequently with 
40 Jackie Chan, Weibo, 10 March 2018, https://weibo.com/1234552257/G6Iwu6vVF?from=p
age_1006051234552257_profile&wvr=6&mod=weibotime&type=comment.
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the China Green Foundation (zhongguo lühua jijinhui) and the Starlight Charity 
Alliance (xingguang gongyi lianmeng) on Weibo and, in addition, makes yearly posts 
about the Earth Hour annual grassroots movement for the environment.41 The 
other three celebrity diplomats of her generation are also deeply involved with 
China’s local activist networks in their respective issue areas. The new-generation 
ambassadors, by contrast, have been rather inactive outside their UN roles. Tong 
Dawei is an extreme example, having posted nothing at all on women-related 
issues in a non-UN context. The search words that we used in this case were 
‘gender’ (xingbie), ‘women/females’ (nüxing/funü) and ‘equality’ (pingdeng), all of 
which appeared frequently in his UN-related advocacy posts. 
Moreover, the older generation’s activism shows more consistency when 
compared to that of the new-generation ambassadors, who give the impression 
of conducting ad hoc activism, especially outside their UN roles. As can be seen 
from figure 2, their posting patterns display a high level of irregularity and there 
are clear ‘gap years’ in which no advocacy posts have been observed.
The intensity and consistency of the old-generation ambassadors’ activism can 
be explained as a simple result of years of accumulated work. However, returning 
to the key research question of this study—that is, whether UN-affiliated celebri-
ties have become more active as ambassadors on Weibo—there is a third commu-
nicative pattern that sets the two generations of celebrities apart. While the 
new-generation diplomats, from Hai Qing to Karry Wang, have generally become 
more active in UN-related activism in the selected time-frame, the number of UN 
advocacy posts made by the old-generation ambassadors has not visibly increased. 
In the context of the UN’s own expanded Weibo activity (via its official accounts) 
in recent years, this lack of increase in absolute post numbers indicates a decline in 
real activism.
This is most apparent in the case of Lang Lang, a UNICEF goodwill ambassador 
since 2004 and UN messenger of peace since 2013, whose UN advocacy has fallen 
from a peak of 16 posts in 2013 to just one in 2019. Li Bingbing’s environmen-
tal activism displays the same pattern. While her UNEP advocacy seems to have 
experienced a revival in 2019, when viewed in connection with the low number of 
non-UN advocacy posts that she made in the same year, the revival seems conten-
tious. Chen Kun has never posted many UNICEF-related posts, while his activ-
ism beyond his UN role has been steadily declining. Jackie Chan, our ‘invisible 
UNICEF ambassador’, has essentially stopped all activism on Weibo. All this leads 
us to one conclusion: for the old-generation UN ambassadors, China’s changing 
political environment has had a greater influence on celebrities’ online presence 
than the growing incentive to be an advocate for the UN’s cosmopolitan values.
Between activism and symbolism
Why have the new-generation ambassadors not been frustrated in their efforts 
to amplify the UN’s messages? As mentioned above, their UN activism seems 
41 An appendix with a selection of sample posts and their translation is available from the authors.
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to be increasing. One explanation that suggests itself is that their activism has 
become more symbolic and, arguably, that the use of symbols to represent ideas 
is inevitably on the rise in a party-state in which the room for individual activism 
is circumscribed. 
This symbolism reveals itself in the delocalization and sloganization of the content 
of the new-generation ambassadors’ UN-related posts. In fact, the more recent posts 
made by the three old-generation ambassadors who have ever posted UN-related 
advocacy content display the same tendencies. Delocalization refers to the tendency 
of addressing ‘global’ problems instead of China’s domestic problems. A good 
example is Chen Kun, who, as UNICEF’s goodwill ambassador for China, once 
made a series of posts about his official visit to a poverty-stricken region in south-
west China and reported in detail children’s living conditions there between 2012 
and 2013. He also made a post in 2013 about a local case of child abuse, mentioning 
UNICEF’s official account. The keywords used to investigate these two cases were 
‘children/kids’ (ertong/haizi) and ‘little friends’ (xiaopengyou), the latter being a very 
informal and intimate way of referring to children in the Chinese language. It is 
striking that, as shown in our research, Chen Kun stopped mentioning children-
related problems in China in his UN-advocacy posts after 2013. 
Sloganization, on the other hand, means a tendency in celebrities’ Weibo 
advocacy to circumvent the stage of rationalizing an action, which entails exposing 
and debating an issue, and to move swiftly to a call for action. This tendency is 
reflected most directly in these celebrities’ increasing interest in celebrating UN 
anniversaries and international commemorative dates that relate to their respective 
issue areas. To take Chen Kun as an example again, the three UN posts he made 
in 2018 and 2019 are all commemorative posts calling for more action for children’s 
welfare, while addressing no specific problems at all.
We argue that Chinese celebrities’ symbolic UN activism offers a way out of a 
difficult problem, as it enables them simultaneously to assume the moral leadership 
expected of them by their domestic public, fulfil their obligations as UN ambas-
sadors and endorse the party-state’s UN discourse. This compromise seems to be 
unavoidable in today’s China. We predict further harmonization of these aims in 
the form of even greater resort to symbolism in Chinese celebrities’ UN activism 
as the tacitly sanctioned, officially tolerated mode of communication. In China’s 
current public space, the advocacy styles of old-generation and new-generation 
UN goodwill ambassadors are bound to become increasingly aligned in their 
greater embrace of symbolism on Weibo. 
Conclusions
Against the backdrop of China’s increasing engagement with the UN during 
Xi Jinping’s presidency, our research aimed to answer the question of whether 
Chinese UN-affiliated celebrities have become more active ambassadors and have 
changed their presence and communication on Weibo. Our analysis of social media 
data has shed light on how Chinese celebrities navigate the diverse and sometimes 
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conflicting expectations of three parties. First, there is the UN as the accrediting 
international organization, all of whose strategies and policies are geared towards 
the propagation of universal values. Second, there is China’s government, which 
has an overriding interest in using Chinese stars and role models to promote 
nationalist narratives, and offers little scope and tolerance for deviant messaging 
in China’s infosphere. Third, there are Chinese societal expectations of national 
heroes, which lead to the wider public in China casting ‘their’ celebrities as moral 
role models.
Our research unveiled some interesting patterns of online behaviour by Chinese 
celebrity ambassadors. Those appointed before 2013 have reduced their activism, 
while conversely latecomers appointed during the current presidency have become 
more active. Next, Chinese celebrities acting as informal UN representatives 
appear to be tiptoeing in a profoundly political online space, and have turned to 
the use of linguistic tools in a semantic public arena much more attuned to nuance 
than the West. We have noted increasing symbolism in Chinese celebrity ambas-
sadors’ recent activism, reflected in their tendency to delocalize or universalize 
the content of their posts. Any previously existing opportunities for Chinese 
UN goodwill ambassadors to discuss work towards the achievement of the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals within China have all but evaporated. Chinese 
UN celebrities have also progressively employed sloganization as a linguistic 
tool in their online presence. Their strategic use of calls for action in the form 
of non-dialogical slogans has the effect of steering clear of Weibo’s deliberative 
potential, which does not seem coincidental. Finally, and further accentuating the 
domestic politicization of UN celebrity activism in China, our research suggests 
the distinct possibility of a causal relationship between a Hong Kong identity and 
inactivity as a UN ambassador on Weibo on the part of Chinese celebrities. 
The results of our empirical study provide the UN with some important 
insights into the status of its celebrity diplomacy project in China, and give rise 
to some recommendations for the UN and for the Chinese government. Chinese 
celebrities prefer to hold back in their communications on UN issues. Celeb-
rities’ commercial success and personal standing in the community are closely 
tied to the official sanctioning of their online behaviour, and they hence opt for 
symbolic activism and sloganization. This suggests that UN headquarters would 
benefit from an evidence-based understanding of how apparently straightforward 
central messages unfold in the special case and local circumstances of China. The 
related UN communications strategy should therefore not be limited to global 
messaging and narration from the centre, but should also critically examine the 
translation and adaptation of central messages by its goodwill ambassadors in 
receiving countries. This is a condition for the future practical and effective use 
of UN goodwill ambassadors in the public space of China and, indeed, many 
other authoritarian member states of the UN. In China, we see very clearly how 
diplomatic volunteers for the UN are navigating the respective demands of their 
sending organization’s interests and their own national identity, loyalties, political 
calculations and commercial interests.
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The Chinese government can perhaps also gain some insights from this so far 
unexplored facet of China–UN relations. Agenda-setting is clearly the business of 
the party-state, but the number of sui generis non-state actors is bound to increase, 
as is China’s engagement with the UN. Far from being trivial players, China’s 
celebrities—if empowered as affective diplomats—have much to contribute in 
gaining domestic support for China’s global ambitions. Considering the factors 
identified in our research, it nonetheless remains doubtful, though yet to be 
established, whether the Chinese celebrities themselves benefit from any form of 
enhanced agency as a result of their informal diplomatic activity—as opposed to 
what is generally assumed regarding celebrity agency in democratic settings.
One obvious limitation of this study is that it does not benefit from compre-
hensive statistical analysis. We propose that a larger, follow-up project could 
consider questions about the effectiveness of ‘symbolic activism’, in terms of 
message amplification and generating conversations; about how Chinese celebri-
ties’ UN activism connects discursively with government narratives and grassroots 
online initiatives; and about how celebrity diplomacy on Weibo differs from that 
conducted on western social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
Our research additionally enlightens the study of public diplomacy. This 
article lends empirical support to the suggestion that students of public diplomacy 
should pay more attention to both national diplomatic actors’ domestic spheres 
and what happens to the public diplomacy messages and narratives of states and 
international organizations in receiving countries. Significant learning can be 
expected from empirically examining these two dimensions of public diplomacy 
activity more thoroughly, instead of privileging the sending strategies, policies 
and practices of public diplomacy actors. 
As this article shows, the UN goodwill ambassador scheme is not just a challenge 
for China, in the sense that UN ambassadors need to stay on message, but is equally 
a creative opportunity in terms of stealthily aligning UN communication with the 
Chinese government’s domestic communications on global issues. Ultimately, it 
can be seen as a success for the party-state that Chinese UN goodwill ambassa-
dors on Weibo have increasingly loaded their online messaging with symbolic and 
nationalist content so as to harmonize their UN messaging with official Chinese 
party-state narratives.
Finally, our research substantiates the argument for more and better research 
on celebrity diplomacy. The issue of how systematic empirical research informs 
our conceptual understanding and theorizing of social phenomena is often 
overlooked. Here, the limitations of existing research on celebrity diplomacy are 
a case in point. This study represents an implicit yet important argument in favour 
of more research outside the linguistic and cultural straitjacket of the Anglosphere. 
It underlines the importance of more scrutiny of celebrity diplomacy in authori-
tarian spaces, as no country on Earth seems to escape the marvel of celebrities.
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